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In January 2000, the Egyptian People’s Assembly passed a new law affecting 
women’s rights to divorce as well as other matters. The Egyptian press and different 
sectors of the public had been engaged in prolonged debate about this piece of 
legislation, in debates examined later in this article. External media gave positive 
coverage: the BBC for example ran headlines on its Online service such as ‘Egypt 
debates better deal for women’ and ‘Small victory of Egyptian women’; 1 The 
Guardian had an article entitled ‘Egypt’s sexist divorce laws blamed not on Islam but 
on men’, The Independent ran ‘Egypt women start a revolution in divorce laws,’ and 
The New York Times greeted the entering into force of the new law with ‘Egypt’s 
Women Win Equal Rights to Divorce’. 2 The title of an article by Oussama Arabi, one 
of several scholarly considerations of the law and what it represents, indicates some of 
the significance perceived by observers and commentators from different disciplines 
and perspectives: ‘The Dawning of the Third Millenium on Shari`a: Egypt’s Law 
No.1 of 2000, or Women May Divorce at Will.’3 
 
Law No. 1 of 20004 is entitled Law  Regulating Certain Conditions and 
Procedures of Litigation in Personal Status Matters.5  The shorthand by which it has 
come to be known in parts of the Egyptian press is the Law of Khul`,6 after the most 
controversial of its provisions: what Arabi refers to as ‘women divorcing at will.’ 
Khul` is a form of divorce long established in Islamic jurisprudence; English language 
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writers on Islamic family law usually gloss it as ‘divorce by mutual agreement.’7 
Essentially it involves the wife offering (or agreeing to pay) a consideration8 to her 
husband in exchange for his pronouncing a divorce (talaq), which takes immediate 
effect as a final talaq and is therefore not subject to revocation by the husband during 
the ‘waiting period’ of the wife following the divorce.9 The jurisprudential 
discussions of the Sunni schools of law examine such matters as what happens if the 
offer of a khul` is withdrawn, what is lawful compensation, and whether the husband 
may demand that his wife pay compensation more than the value of the dower.10 
However, as Arabi shows,11 the jurists concur on the principle of mutual agreement: it 
is the husband who issues the talaq in such a divorce, and his participation in the 
process means that his agreement is integral.12 A khul` is, in traditional Sunni law, a 
non-litigious form of divorce; no grounds have to be established or recognised by 
court; the couple concerned agree and the divorce is effected, whether this occurs 
extra-judicially, or whether the agreement is actually made or affirmed in court 
(possibly with the court’s assistance in reaching an agreement). What Egypt’s Law 
No.1 of 2000 did was to empower – or rather instruct - the court to effect a khul` 
divorce at the wife’s petition, in the event of the husband refusing to agree.  
 
 This article begins with a brief overview of Egypt’s reform of its divorce laws 
over the course of the twentieth century in order to contextualise the new law and its 
implications for women’s right to divorce, before proceeding to consider the new law. 
The examination of the new law includes a review of the motivations for and 
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 In practice this may involve the wife waiving (ibra’) any outstanding financial rights (including her 
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objections to its promulgation, and of reports on how it appears to be operating in 
practice. 
 
Divorce Law in Egypt: Early Reforms  
 
 Unlike most of its close neighbours in both the Arab East and North Africa, 
Egypt has yet to promulgate a full code of personal status law for Muslims. It has 
addressed particular personal status matters in a number of laws from the early 
twentieth century.13 Personal status law is applied to the Muslim majority population 
and to recognised non-Muslim communities through a unified national court system; 
in the case of Muslim personal status law, the dominant opinions of the Hanafi school 
of law remain the residual jurisprudential authority.14 
 
 In reforming its divorce laws, Egypt proceeded along the same path as many 
of its neighbours that were also addressing issues in Hanafi law. This involved two 
main approaches. The first was to constrain the impact of the man’s pronouncement 
of unilateral talaq in certain physical and psychological circumstances, so that either 
no divorce took effect, or a single revocable divorce was effected in place of what 
Hanafi law (and in some cases the law of all four Sunni schools) would have ruled a 
three-fold and irrevocable talaq.15  The second was to expand the grounds on which 
the wife could seek judicial divorce (tafriq/tatliq) beyond the extremely constrained 
grounds available under the dominant Hanafi legal opinions;16 the approach here was, 
broadly,  to specify, through using rules introduced from other schools of law, 
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 For an early comparison of the terms of the Ottoman Law of Family Rights 1917 and the Egyptian 
Laws Nos. 25/1920 and 25/1929, see J.N.D. Anderson, ‘Recent Developments in Shari`a Law V: The 
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circumstances that would be considered to harm or injury to wife, giving rise to a 
right to the remedy of judicial divorce. 
 
Thus, Law No. 25 of 192017 permitted the wife to petition the court for divorce 
if her husband was unable to pay her maintenance or was absent or refusing to pay 
and had no visible assets on which a maintenance order could be executed. It also 
permitted a petition for divorce if the husband was either found to have or later 
developed a chronic and incurable condition that would cause injury to wife were she 
to remain in the marriage.18  A second law, Law no.25 of 1929,19 established grounds 
for divorce at the wife’s petition if she had suffered injury due to her husband’s 
absence from her, without reasonable justification, for a year or more, extending this 
also to allow a woman to apply if her husband had received a final prison sentence of 
three years or more, once the first year of imprisonment had passed.20 Also 
established as grounds in this law was a more general ground of ‘injury of a kind that 
would render it impossible for a couple such as they to continue living together.’ 
Establishment of such injury (which as indicated in the text is a relative concept21) 
entitles the wife to a judicial divorce.22 If the wife is unable to prove such harm and 
therefore fails to obtain a divorce on these grounds, but subsequently repeats her 
claim, the law provides for an arbitration process to be initiated by the court, 
involving two arbitrators (preferably from the families of the spouses) who are 
instructed to attempt to reconcile the spouses.23 If they fail, the law provided that “if 
the arbitrators find the fault to be that of the husband, of both sides, or not clearly 
attributable to either, they shall decree a final divorce.”24 What the law did not 
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 Law No.25 of 1920 Concerning Maintenance and Certain Provisions of Personal Status, Official 
Gazette no.61 of 15 July 1920. 
18
 Articles 4, 5 and 9 of Law No.25 of 1920. The examples given of an incurable disease (‘or curable 
only after a long time’) are leprosy and madness. 
19
 Law No. 25 of 1929 Concerning Certain Provisions of Personal Status, Official Gazette no.27 of 25 
March 1929. For the way in which the shari`a courts of Egypt implemented these provisions before 
their abolition, see Ron Shaham, Family and the Courts in Modern Egypt: A Study based on Decisions 
by the Shari`a Courts, 1900-1955, Leiden: Brill 1997 113-138. 
20
 Articles 12 – 14 of Law No.25 of 1929. 
21
 The phrase ‘a couple such as they’ (bayna amthalihuma: literally ‘among their like/peers’)was 
translated in 1951 by Anderson as ‘people of their class’ (‘Recent Developments’ 284). See Shaham,  
Family and the Courts, 121-124 on the interpretation of ‘injury’ in the shari`a court system to the 
1950s; and for an examination of the ‘relativity of the notion of injury’ in more recent application, see 
Hoda Fahmi, Divorcer en Egypte: Etude de l’application des lois du statut personnel, Cairo: 
CEDEJ,1987,  21-23. 
22
 Article 6 of Law No. 25 of 1929. 
23
 Articles 7 and 8 of Law No. 25 of 1929. 
24
 Article 9 of Law No. 25 of 1929; Anderson, ‘Recent Developments,’ 286. 
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provide for was the remainder of the procedure established in Maliki law whereby if 
the arbitrators found the wife to be wholly or partly at fault, they would rule for a 
divorce with the wife’s forfeiture of all or part of her dower. Writing in 1951, Norman 
Anderson noted that this gap in the Egyptian rules “is felt by many to be a defect in 
the Egyptian legislation which is likely to be revised in the future.”25 The revision was 
however not to come until 1979. 
 
 This second law also tackled the man’s unilateral power of talaq, setting about 
reducing the essentially unintended consequences of expressions of talaq in certain 
circumstances. Thus, provisions of Law No.25 of 1929 stipulated that, in exception to 
the dominant opinions of Hanafi law, no divorce occurred if a man pronounced the 
talaq when intoxicated or under duress, or if he used a form of suspended or 
conditional talaq that was actually intended to have someone do or not do something 
(rather than being intended to cause a divorce); or indeed if he used indirect or 
metaphorical expressions of talaq that were not in fact intended to cause a talaq to 
occur. The law also provided that a talaq accompanied in word or sign by a number 
would give rise only to a single revocable talaq, rather than causing the immediate 
and irrevocable ‘triple talaq’ of traditional Sunni law. Other expressions of finality 
were held to cause only a single revocable divorce through a provision stipulating that 
“every talaq falls revocable, except the third of three, divorce before consummation, 
divorce for remuneration, or any other divorce explicitly designated as final under this 
or the previous law (of 1920).” Anderson considers these last three measures as 
“drastic” amendments to the existing Hanafi (and in some cases majority Sunni) 
doctrine, which went beyond the preceding reforms in the Ottoman Law of Family 
Rights applicable elsewhere in the region;26 they have been taken up and in a few 
cases developed in subsequent personal status codes in different Arab states. 
 
Later Reforms  
 
 Further reforms in divorce law in Egypt had to await the 1970s, although the 
decades in between saw a number of attempts and proposals for more comprehensive 
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 Anderson, ‘Recent Developments,’ 286; although he does cite certain jurisprudential authority for 
the restricted position initially taken by the Egyptian legislator. Compare Shaham, Family and the 
Courts, 117. 
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 Anderson, ‘Recent Developments,’ 276. 
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legislation on personal status law issues failing due to the intervention of external 
events (for example the 1967 Arab-Israeli war) and/or what Fauzi Najjar describes as 
“stiff opposition from religious conservatives.” 27  Among other provisions on 
personal status (for example on custody arrangements for minor children), Law No. 
44 of 1979 introduced three substantial amendments to existing divorce law.  
 
In the first, it tackled the problem of wives not knowing that their husbands 
had divorced them by talaq. Under traditional Sunni law, talaq is an extra-judicial 
procedure in no need of a court’s intervention or indeed of any form of official 
documentation for its validity. Abuses of the system were cited as justifying a 
provision in Law No.44 of 1979 requiring husbands to document their talaq with the 
appropriate notary and providing that the consequences of the divorce as far as the 
wife was concerned would take effect only from the date she is made aware of its 
occurrence – that is, rather than from the date it occurred, a controversial position for 
some. The wife would be considered to know of the talaq through attending its 
notarisation, and if not present at that documentation procedure then she was to be 
formally notified in person or at her place of residence through an official. The law 
also set penalties of six months imprisonment and/or a fine28 for violation of the terms 
of this provision.29  
 
In the second substantive amendment, Law no.44 of 1979 tackled the wife’s 
right to a remedy in the event of a polygynous marriage by her husband, providing 
that “it shall be considered injury to the wife if the husband marries another wife 
without her consent even if she has not stipulated in the contract of marriage that he 
shall not marry another wife while married to her; similarly [it shall be considered an 
injury] if the husband conceals to his new wife the fact that he is already married.” A 
dissenting wife in this situation was entitled to seek judicial divorce on the grounds of 
this injury for a period of a year from the date she first learned of the husband’s 
polygynous marriage.30 The decidedly non-‘traditional’ point about this provision was 
its establishment of a legal presumption of injury arising through the mere fact of a 
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 Fauzi M. Najjar, ‘Egypt’s Laws of Personal Status,’ 10/3 Arab Studies Quarterly (1988) 319-344, at 
320. Legislation on certain aspects of the law of succession was issued in the 1940s. 
28
 Of 200 Egyptian pounds. 
29
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 7 
polygynous union not consented to by the wife. Critics argued, broadly, that this was 
effectively ruling that an institution permitted in Islamic jurisprudence ipso facto 
caused injury, a proposition untenable in light, inter alia, of the fundamental principle 
of Islamic jurisprudence of averting and remedying injury.  
 
 In the third, Law no.44 of 1979 introduced changes in line with standard 
Maliki law to the existing provision on judicial divorce for discord after the 
arbitration process in Law no.25 of 1929. If the arbitrators fail to reconcile the 
spouses, the amendment required them to include in their divorce recommendation to 
the court an assessment of fault: depending on the proportion of blame attached by the 
arbitrators to husband and wife, the court may rule for a divorce leaving the wife with 
all her financial rights intact, or may order that she provide an ‘exchange’ or a 
‘recompense’  (badal) proportionate to her fault – that is, forfeit some or all of them 
to the husband. In theory, the arbitrators are supposed to complete their task within six 
months, with a possibility of one three month extension.31 This form of divorce, 
subtitled ‘divorce for discord’ (shiqaq) in the law, is distinct from the traditional form 
of khul` through its necessary involvement of the court in litigation processes, and 
through the involvement of arbitrators to assess the proportions of blame. In the new 
provision for judicial khul` in Egypt, although as will be seen there is a requirement 
for mediators to be appointed, their only role is only to attempt reconciliation, rather 
than, having failed in this attempt, to assess blame and the ensuing financial 
arrangements for application by the court. 
 
Law No.44 of 1979 was controversial before its promulgation (Najjar reports a 
four-year build-up to Sadat’s action)32 and challenged almost immediately afterwards; 
it was eventually repealed in 1985. The “Egyptian family law saga”33 of the late 
1970s and 1980s is often cited as an illustration of sensitivities involved in reforming 
Muslim family law in Arab states, and of the external, nominally unrelated socio-
political issues that may motivate those opposing change. Support for the 1979 law 
was closely associated with the person of Jihan Sadat, wife of the then President 
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Anwar Sadat, and was perceived by some observers as a response to the ‘Islamist’ 
challenge being posed to the government and political parties at the time. A counter-
mobilisation among the Islamist groups charged Jihan Sadat and her associates among 
the Egyptian feminist movement with being ‘Westernized’, in discourses that are 
immediately evocative of similar discourses elsewhere in the region, and indeed of 
criticisms levelled at women supporting the new law of 2000 in Egypt.34 The 1979 
law became known as “Jihan’s Law” and Nadia Hijab observes that “this came to be 
used in a derogatory sense as the Sadats became increasingly unpopular in Egypt.”35 
Mervat Hatem puts the discussions on family law reform in the context of the 
unpopularity of Egypt’s Camp David agreement with Israel, which undermined on 
‘unrelated’ grounds the prospects for the law to be passed by the People’s 
Assembly.36 President Sadat passed the 1979 law by decree, invoking just a couple of 
days before the reconvening of the People’s Assembly his constitutional power to 
“take measures which cannot suffer delay” during a parliamentary recess.37 Hatem 
reports that the decree was attacked by the left as authoritarian and anti-democratic 
and by the right as contradicting the shari`a, while women found themselves in the 
particular dilemma of not wanting to support anti-democratic methods in law-making 
and not wishing to denounce the changes introduced by its terms.38 The law was duly 
brought before the People’s Assembly, which was controlled by a majority of the 
President’s National Democratic Party; Najjar notes that “as was expected, the 
Assembly approved the law, but not without one of its liveliest debates.”39 Najjar’s 
examination of the debates in the Assembly compares to analyses made of the debates 
on the latest law No.1 of 2000, in the sense that arguments both for and against were 
made on the grounds of the compatibility or otherwise of the different provisions with 
“the Islamic shari`a,” almost to the exclusion of other discourses and 
considerations.40 
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 Mervat Hatem, ‘Economic and Political Liberation in Egypt and the Demise of State Feminism,’ 24 
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 Opposition by “Muslim conservatives”41 to the terms of Law no.44 of 1979 
continued after its approval by the People’s Assembly. Critics included some 
members of the judiciary; one study found twenty out of twenty seven judges 
interviewed to hold the legal presumption of injury arising from polygyny to be an 
explicit violation of the shari`a, and reported one as stating that “he himself had 
refused to implement the law and had postponed all such cases referred to him.”42 
 
In the end however it was the form rather than the substance of Law No.44 of 
1979 that fell foul of Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court, which in 1985 struck 
down the 1979 law as having been promulgated in violation of the constitutional 
constraints of ‘necessity’ on the president’s powers to issue legislation by decree in 
the absence of parliament. A vigorous response among women deputies in the 
National Assembly and among NGOs led to the establishment of the Committee for 
the Defence of the Rights of Women and the Family specifically to undertake 
advocacy efforts on reform of family law.43 The state however – now under President 
Mubarak’s leadership - also moved quickly, in the face inter alia of the swiftly-
approaching Nairobi conference at the end of the United Nations Decade for Women: 
Law no.100 of 1985 was presented and passed through the Assembly within weeks of 
the repeal of the 1979 law. The advocacy efforts of the women’s movement outlived 
the promulgation of the new law, feeding into the momentum for and content of the 
later law in 2000.44 
 
The provisions of Law No. 100 of 198545 wrought changes to two of the three 
substantive reforms to divorce law introduced by Law no.44 of 1979. Firstly, while 
repeating the requirement for talaq to be notarised and the wife to be properly 
informed, the new law set a limit of thirty days during which the notarisation has to 
occur, and provided that its consequences (“in terms of inheritance and other financial 
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 Najjar, ‘Egypt’s Laws,’ 336. 
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 Essam Fawzi, ‘Muslim Personal Status Law in Egypt: Prospects for Reform through Internal 
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no.27 of 4 July 1985. 
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rights”) take effect from the date the talaq occurs “unless the husband conceals it 
from his wife,” in which case the consequences take effect from the date she knows of 
the divorce.46 The general rule of suspension of the effects of talaq on a wife’s 
knowledge thereof in the 1979 law thus became constrained to the particular 
circumstances of deliberate concealment. Secondly, the innovative legal presumption 
of injury arising by the fact of a polygynous marriage by the husband of a wife who 
has not consented disappeared in Law no.100 of 1985, replaced by wording requiring 
the wife to establish such injury to the court’s satisfaction. The new provision reads 
that such a wife may “petition for judicial divorce from him if she is affected by some 
material or moral harm of a kind which makes it impossible for a couple such as they 
to continue living together, even if she has not stipulated in the contract that he should 
not take further wives.”47 The provisions for judicial divorce for ‘discord’ (shiqaq) 
between the spouses following a wife’s failed attempt to establish injury and the 
investigations of arbitrators are maintained in the 1985 law.48 
 
 
Law No.1 of 2000 
 
 Unlike the 1979 and 1985 laws, Law No. 1 of 2000 was not issued in the form 
of amendments and supplements to the laws of 1920 and 1929. As suggested by its 
title, Law Regulating Certain Conditions and Procedures of Litigation in Personal 
Status Matters, it is essentially a procedural law, described by Dawoud El Alami as “a 
law designed to rationalize and consolidate judicial procedure in personal status cases 
in a single law.”49 This aspect of the law has been generally applauded, as has the 
intention of reducing both the effort and the expense of litigation.50 Besides the 
provisions on khul`, discussed below, Law no.1 of 2000 introduces further changes to 
Egyptian divorce law.  Firstly, it supplements through a procedural regulation the 
notarisation and registration requirement made in Law no.25 of 1929, as amended by 
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Law no.100 of 1985. Law no.1 of 2000 provides that in the event of a talaq being 
denied, the court will find it established only by the formal notarisation and 
documentation process required in the earlier law.51 Critics of this provision voiced 
concern at the apparent denial of legal validity to a contested talaq otherwise perfectly 
valid under the shari`a. Others argued in support on the grounds that it would further 
protect women’s rights and oblige the husband to document his talaq and have the 
wife notified accordingly. Fawzi reports particular support among a sample of lawyers 
and members of the judiciary familiar with what he describes as the “predicaments” 
of the complexities of existing procedure.52  In a draft explanatory memorandum to 
the first draft of the law presented to the People’s Assembly, the government argued 
that this provision effectively brought legal recognition of talaq into line with legal 
recognition of marriage – which, in the event of denial, has had to be established by 
official document since Law no.78 of 1931 in order for any claims related to that 
marriage to be considered by the court.53 In an explicit recognition of the normative 
pluralism involved in this approach, the draft memorandum noted that while such a 
talaq would not count in law (qanunan), “this does not take away from the fact that 
the talaq occurs in religion (diyanatan).”54  
 
 A further change to divorce law arose directly from the above-mentioned 
long-established rules on marriage registration and the social phenomenon of 
unregistered, informal or ‘customary’ marriage (`urfi marriage), which has attracted 
much attention in Egypt in recent years.  An `urfi marriage is typically concluded with 
a customary document replacing the official marriage registration procedures, serving 
inter alia to avert charges of illicit sexual relations. Although an `urfi marriage may 
technically fulfil the shar`i requirements for a valid marriage, and although there are a 
range of motivations underlying this form of marriage, there is strong disapproval 
from the authorities and public concern expressed at the potential for exploitation and 
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abuse of the rights particularly of young women getting involved in such 
arrangements.55 A woman whose husband in an `urfi marriage was refusing to divorce 
her could not prove the marriage in court due to the exclusion from jurisdiction of 
claims arising from marriages denied by one party and not officially documented. 
Unable to prove the marriage, she not only could not claim any of her rights from the 
marriage, but also could not obtain a divorce from the court. Law no.1 of 2000 
specifically addresses this last issue, adding to the provision denying jurisdiction for 
claims arising from marriages not officially documented a clause to the effect that 
“nevertheless, a claim of judicial divorce (tatliq) or dissolution (faskh) shall be 
accepted – to the exclusion of all other claims – if the marriage is established by any 
document.”56 Those objecting to the provision argued that it ‘legitimised’ `urfi 
marriage and risked encouraging the practice by providing a way out.57 Viewed by 
some observers as a concession by the official legal system to the unofficial practice, 
it is presented by the authorities as a protective measure to provide a remedy for 
women affected by the injury of this situation, enabling them at least to divorce and 
marry again if they choose.  
 
 
‘The Law of Khul`’ 
 
                                                 
55
 `Urfi marriage is a complex phenomenon, and the opposition of the authorities is not derived only 
from their insistence on bureaucratic procedure. Fawzi for example reports that certain Islamist 
elements active in university circles have declared that `urfi marriage may be legitimate according to 
the shari`a  if all it lacks is government certification. Other concerns revolve around marriages of 
younger women (away at university for example) without the knowledge of their families, and perhaps 
to younger men unable to afford the financial burdens of a wedding and marriage in the manner that 
would be expected (see below); and the marriage of underage females (sometimes to wealthy older 
men) avoiding the age requirements of the official documentation procedures, which require the bride 
to be at least sixteen years old by the solar calendar. Fawzi also gives examples of situations in which 
older women make an informed choice not to formally register their new marriage. See generally 
Fawzi, ‘Muslim Personal Status law in Egypt’. Reporting the initial results of a public opinion poll it 
carried out in 2000, Almishkat Centre for Research noted that “`Urfi marriage, which many perceive as 
motivated solely by economic reasons (many young men unable to afford the amount of money 
necessary for a “normal” marriage: a dwelling, a dowry and the cost of the wedding reception), was 
considered wrong by 93.71 % of the sample.” Almishkat Centre for Research, ‘The Ultimate 
Emancipaton of Women is in the Minds,’ at http://www.almishkat.org/engdoc01, last visited 15 
December 2003. This poll is discussed further below. 
56
 Article 17 of Law No.1 of 2000. 
57
 See Fawzi, ‘Muslim Personal Status Law,’ and Zakariya, ‘Al-khul`’, 70. 
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 The article that prompted the designation of Law no.1 of 2000 as the ‘Law of 
Khul`’ comes in the third chapter of the law, entitled  ‘On the raising of claims and 
their examination.’ Article 20 of Law No.1 of 2000 provides as follows:  
 
  The spouses may agree between themselves on khul`. If they do not so 
agree, and the wife submits a claim seeking [khul`], and she gives 
something for her freedom (/ransoms herself)58 and undertakes a khul` 
from her husband59  by waiving all her legal (shar`i) financial rights and 
returns to him the dower that he gave her, the court shall rule for her 
divorce from him (tatliqha `alayhi). The court shall rule for the divorce 
for khul` only after attempting to achieve reconciliation (sulh) between the 
spouses and charging two mediators to pursue efforts to effect 
reconciliation between them, during a period of not more than three 
months, in the manner set out in Articles 18(2) and 19(1) and (2) of this 
law;60 and after the wife has explicitly stated that she loathes life with her 
husband61 and that there is no way for their married life to continue, and 
that she is afraid that she will not [be able to] live within the limits 
ordained by Allah62 because of this loathing. 
 
 Article 20 goes on to state that the wife’s waiving of her entitlement to 
custody of children from the marriage, or their maintenance or other rights, shall not 
be a valid consideration for khul`;  that in all cases, the khul` gives rise to a final 
talaq; and that a ruling for khul` shall not be open to any form of legal appeal.  
 
                                                 
58
 This phrase (iftadat nafsaha), uses the same language as that in the Quranic verse cited in the draft 
explanatory memorandum as a source for this provision, 2:229. In English translations it is variously 
translated as ‘if she gives something for her freedom’ or ‘if she ransoms herself’ (see translations by A. 
Yusuf Ali and Marmeduke Pickthall). 
59
 The phrase here is khala`at zawjaha, from the same root as khul`; since the root meaning of khala`a 
is usually given as ‘taking off’, as in garments, the literal meaning would be takes off, removes or 
‘discards’ her husband, through her act of financial obligation. 
60
 These provisions require the court to make efforts at reconciliation in every claim of talaq and tatliq, 
with specific requirements if there are children from the marriage; and regulate the naming of 
individuals as mediators where the law requires two to be appointed. 
61
 The reference to ‘loathing life with her husband’ evokes the narrative of the hadith given in the 
Explanatory Memorandum as the second source of legitimacy for this provision, and generally cited as 
the basis for khul` divorce.  For different versions of the hadith in point, see Arabi, ‘The Dawning of 
the Third Millenium,’ 180-186. 
62
 The reference to not living within “the limits ordained by Allah” also uses language found in the 
same Quranic verse 2:229. 
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 Later in the year 2000, the National Council for Women,63 responding to a 
question from the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women considering Egypt’s combined fourth and fifth periodic reports, gave 
the following assessment of the significance of the khul` provision: 
 
An important step has been taken to promote equality between women 
and men in the area of Family Law which will pave the way to make 
Egypt’s withdrawal of its reservation to Article 16 possible. Law no. 1 of 
2000, effective as of 1 March 2000, gave women the equal right of 
divorce through “Khul`,” or repudiation, which is the indigenous Islamic 
formulation of women’s equal right to divorce for incompatibility without 
need to prove damage. The law also enhanced justice, including social and 
economic rights of women, and put an end to the suffering of over one 
million women each year involved in divorce cases. Such cases used to 
last from five to seven years on average and sometimes end with denial of 
divorce.64 
 
 Two of the elements in this presentation coincide with arguments made 
domestically by the Egyptian government in support of the provision on khul` in Law 
no.1 of 2000: its provenance from within the Islamic tradition, and the urgent need to 
speed up court procedures in view of the huge number of cases accumulating in the 
courts and extremely protracted litigation. Hoda Fahmi’s ethnographic study of 
divorce cases at a Cairo court in the early 1980s indicates the pressures already 
evident on the system at that time: 
 
En général, les procédures s’étalent sur de longues périodes. La plupart 
des plaideurs attendant le jugement durant au moins deux ans. D’autres 
meme, durant quatre ans. Une femme m’a affirmé avoir vu son cas en 
                                                 
63
 An “independent national body” to promote the advancement of women, established by decree on 8 
February 2000, replacing the previously existing National Committee for Women. 
64
 CEDAW/PSWG/2001/I/CRP.2/Add.3 23 October 2000; page 4, on Question 3. Article 16 of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women concerns equality in 
marriage and at its dissolution.  
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suspens pendant sept ans. Certaines, qui en sont encore au stade de la 
notification, ont déjá perdu une année entière á la cour.65 
  
Fahmi reports the judges hugely overburdened, resorting to frequent adjournments 
and often spending “just a few seconds” talking with the petitioners or their 
representatives.66 She observes that this is particularly the case with women of the 
‘popular classes’ who may see their cases dragging on for years; the effect, according 
to Fahmi, is a realisation by such women that they are “becoming victims of the 
bureaucratic system”:  
 
Ainsi, une des femmes interviewées, d’origine urbaine, réalisant á quel 
point l’expérience du tribunal était exténuante, a finalement décidé, au 
bout de deux ans de lutte, de “s’arranger” avec son mari qui s’était entre 
temps marié à une autre femme. Elle s’était endettée auprès de plusieurs 
personnes pour faire face aux dépenses, sans qu’apparaisse aucune issue à 
son cas. Finalement elle a été d’accord pour signer un papier déclarant 
qu’elle renoncait à ses droits matériels en échange de la repudiation.67 
 
 The abundance of such stories was a powerful argument made for the khul` 
provision; women – particularly poor women - were being forced into concluding a 
khul` divorce and giving up their financial rights, after investing considerable time 
and money in applying for a judicial divorce, because of the inability (or failure) of 
the judicial system to bring them prompt and equitable resolution of their 
application.68 An agreement on the need for court procedures to be speeded up, 
however, did not necessarily extend to the introduction of judicial khul` as an answer. 
In particular, those opposing the law denied that it was part of traditional Islamic law 
and argued that removing the need for the husband’s consent to a khul` was a direct 
violation of the rules of the shari`a.69 It was argued that all the Sunni schools had 
                                                 
65
 Fahmi, Divorcer en Egypte, 15. 
66
 Ibid 15-16. 
67
 Ibid 19. 
68
 See for example Tahani al-Gabali, ‘Al-Khul` bayn al-qanun wa’l tatbiq,’ in al-Sawi (ed.) Al-hisad, 
39-44, at 39-40; Zakariya, ‘Al-khul`,’ 51; and Azza Soliman and Azza Salah, ‘Al-khul` qanunan wa 
tatbiqan’ (Khul` in law and practice), 13-38 in al-Sawi (ed), Al-Hisad, at 13. 
69
 Zakariya, in her critique of the debates at the People’s Assembly, observes that the emphasis on 
mutual agreement to khul` shifted to a focus on the consent of the husband: ‘Al-khul`,’ 54. 
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required the husband’s agreement to a khul` divorce; that giving the court the power 
to over-ride his refusal to agree effectively removed the husband’s ‘authority’ 
(qiwama)70 over his wife; that it was “throwing a time-bomb into the Muslim 
household for the wife to set off at any moment.” 71 Marlene Tadrus, in an analysis of 
the treatment of the khul` provision in the press, identifies the religious discourse as 
the major framework for the debate.72 She also identifies a range of other arguments 
made by critics, including that this was an attempt to “make the Egyptian family a 
carbon copy of the Western family”; that it did not address the real problems in 
society, which were economic rather than related to personal status law; that women 
were governed by their emotions and were liable to make rash decisions on divorce; 
that the law would destroy the Egyptian family, lead to huge increases in the number 
of divorce cases and “compound the problem of spinsterhood.” She further notes 
evocation of the “conspiracy analysis” in references to “external forces imposing the 
bill,” links drawn with the programmes of international conferences such as the 
International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo and the Beijing 
Fourth World Conference on Women, and the idea of the law as “the fruit of the 
alliance between Western women’s movements and the Egyptian women’s 
movement.”73  
 
Those supporting the khul` provision generally responded within the 
discourses of Islamic jurisprudence and the stability of the family. The draft 
explanatory memorandum did not tackle the issue of the husband’s consent in a 
manner that recognised that reading the source texts in this way might be considered 
contentious or innovative. Rather, it set out the two textual sources as justification for 
the provision (verse 2.229 of the Qur’an and the hadith on the first khul` in Islam), 
and pointed out that the ‘basis’ in khul` is mutual agreement, but that it was 
“established jurisprudentially” that in the event of no agreement, the court could rule 
for the khul`. Beyond this, the memorandum presented judicial khul` within the 
general framework of removing injury. Thus the husband has injury removed from 
                                                 
70
 For an examination of interpretations of this concept in the Qur’an 4:34 see Barbara Stowasser, 
‘Gender Issues and Contemporary Qur’an Interpretation’, 30-44 in Yvonne Haddad and John Esposito 
(eds) Islam, Gender and Social Change, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.  
71
 See review by Fawzi in ‘Muslim Personal Status Law.’ 
72
 Tadrus, ‘Qanun al-khul`,’ 84. She observes that the religious discourse was used by those who 
opposed the provision on a range of other political and social grounds.  
73
 Ibid 89-95.  
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him by the fact that “he may retrieve what he has paid and have raised from his 
shoulders the burden of paying any of the shar`i financial rights of the wife 
thereafter”.  As for the wife, the draft memorandum continued, “this makes his 
holding on to the wife after she has decided to divorce him by khul` an injury to her, 
and the shar`i rule is that there shall be no injury and no counter-injury (la darar wa 
la idrar).”74  The argument here clearly seeks to underpin the legitimacy of judicial 
khul` with the accepted principle of judicial divorce for injury already established in 
Egyptian law. 
 
The third element in the presentation on the khul` provision by the National 
Council for Women is the promotion of equality between men and women in the area 
of family law, a theme picked up in the UK and US press coverage cited at the 
beginning of this article. This element was not, according to Tadrus, a feature in the 
domestic official discourse supporting the law. Despite the contributions made by 
broad sections of the women’s movement to the development of the law, she holds 
that the government appeared keen to distance itself from those calling for equality of 
the sexes; the dominant voices speaking in support appealed to concepts of the 
stability and security of the family, rather than the liberation of women or the 
violation of their rights.  Similarly she found little use made of the discourses of 
citizenship or constitutional rights.75 
 
 The Egyptian government may well have judged that supporting the 
legislation through the discourse of equal rights in family law would not have the 
widest resonance in either the People’s Assembly or wider public opinion in Egypt. 
Coming back to Arabi’s phrase, it was the idea of ‘women divorcing at will’ that 
provoked (and/or was used to provoke) substantial opposition in some quarters: the 
idea that women could divorce their husbands without having to prove grounds, 
indeed with no ‘fault’ on the part of the husband, and against his will. Under the pre-
2000 law, as noted above, a woman who was able and willing to persist might be able, 
eventually, to obtain a judicial divorce (tatliq) from her husband who might be found 
blameless by the arbitrators: but even here, the claim would start with failed claims of 
                                                 
74
 Draft explanatory memorandum, 140-141. It went on to suggest that some wives might prefer the 
option of khul` to that of revealing, through a litigation process, intimate details about their married life 
(at 142). 
75
 Tadrus, ‘Qanun al-khul`,’ 86-88. 
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injury made by the wife, and the husband could indeed be held to be wholly or partly 
to blame by the arbitrators. Just as under the rules on talaq a man can unilaterally 
divorce his wife for no reason on her part and against her will, paying her deferred 
dower and financial compensation as required by Egyptian law, so the deal presented 
by the khul` provision – at its most basic - requires the wife to pay ‘compensation’ to 
her husband in the event of her exercising this option. It is in this sense that the 
National Council for Women presents judicial khul` as ‘women’s equal right to 
divorce for incompatibility without need to prove damage.’ 
 
Perceptions and Practice 
 
 As for Egyptian public opinion, polls and surveys carried out in the run-up to 
the promulgation of the new law showed quite a divide. An ‘elite opinion survey’ 
(including members of the judiciary, journalists, lawyers, civil society activists and 
leaders of different women’s groups) showed 60% in favour of the khul` provision.76 
A survey of broader public opinion found that 48.5% disapproved and 40.5% 
approved, with the rest reporting no comment; in this result, a gender difference was 
clear, with twice as many men disapproving as approved, while more women 
approved than disapproved.77 On the other hand, a poll carried out by Al Ahram 
Weekly and AlMishkat Centre for Research, published in 2001, found 49.94 % 
approving of the promulgation of the khul` provision and 49.52% disagreeing, “with 
no gender distinction”, although more women than men disagreed with the statement 
that ‘it is fair that a woman who seeks khul` must return everything her husband had 
given her.”78 
 
 This last result has interesting resonance with a public opinion survey carried 
out in Palestine after the promulgation of Egyptian No.1 of 2000. Asked whether they 
would like to see a similar provision on khul` enacted in the future Palestinian state, 
only about a third of respondents replied in the affirmative (37% of women and 32% 
of men). Questioned for the reasons, a majority of female respondents supported 
women’s right to obtain a divorce, but those who opposed the provision argued that 
                                                 
76
 Fawzi, ‘Muslim Personal Status Law,’ table 1.21; 300 interviewees. 
77
 Fawzi, ‘Muslim Personal Status Law,’ table 1.29; 200 interviewees. 
78
 www.almishkat.org/engdoc01 figures 1 and 2. Over 1500 persons polled; the report notes that in this 
preliminary poll, “the poll sample over-represents the educated.” 
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women should not have to forfeit their property to do so.79 The issue of what property 
a woman should forfeit for a khul` divorce, and the implications this has for the 
practicalities of the remedy provided by the law, was and is an issue around the 
Egyptian provision. Some opponents of the law had argued that the khul` provision 
was ‘rich women’s law’, allowing a remedy only for those who could afford it. From 
another perspective, Hoda Zakariya points to the risk that a man who mistreats his 
wife may be the real winner through this arrangement, that khul` may end up being a 
deal made by “those despairing of change whose avenues are blocked and find 
themselves in front of two options, the sweetest of which is bitter.”80 Her particular 
criticism is of the requirement in judicial khul` that a woman pays back the prompt 
dower rather than simply waiving (ibra’) the remainder of her financial rights – the 
deferred dower and maintenance for the waiting period – an arrangement she 
identifies as “well known to Egyptian society as a popular remedy to the various 
problems of divorce through the official channels.”81 This scenario she puts in the 
context of the “feminisation of poverty,” concerned that women, particularly in rural 
areas, may not only come out of the marriage with nothing, but may have to “borrow 
against the future” in order to do it, having already put the prompt dower into the 
establishment of the household and the raising of children.82 The ‘equality’ of divorce 
rights entailing a cash repayment of the prompt dower is arguably less than real 
equality given that women are less likely than men to be involved in the waged 
economy. 
 
 In an examination of the implementation of the khul` provision over its first 
two years, Soliman and Salah criticise a lack of clarification in a number of court 
rulings as to how the assessment was made of the dower fees, along with certain cases 
                                                 
79
 Rema Hammami, ‘Doxa and Orthodoxy: Attitudes towards Legal Reform in Personal Status Law,’ in 
Welchman (ed), Women’s Rights and Islamic Family Law. Stratified random sample of 1200 persons. 
80
 Zakariya, ‘Al-khul`’, 52. 
81
 Loc cit. By way of comparison, research in the Palestinian West Bank found divorce for ibra’ 
(referred to as mukhala`a or khul` in the application Jordanian law, and talaq muqabil ibra’ in the court 
records, generally involving the wife waiving her remaining financial rights, not also returning the 
prompt dower) to be the most common form of divorce in the years 1965, 1975 and 1985; of all 
divorces, 90% were non-litigious (talaq or khul`, with only 10% applications for judicial divorce) with 
an overall proportion of these in three courts of 60% khul` to 40% unilateral talaq. See Lynn 
Welchman, Beyond the Code: Muslim Family Law and the Shar`i Judiciary in the Palestinian West 
Bank, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000, 248. 
82
 Zakariya, ‘Al-khul`,’ 52. Compare el-Alami, ‘Remedy or Device?’,139: “The pressures of the cost of 
living mean that the dowry will most probably already have been spent on household items, the 
education of children or generally have been absorbed into the family budget.” 
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where the wife was ordered to pay the deferred dower as well as the prompt dower to 
her husband, rather than waiving her right to the deferred dower.83 They point out that 
the draft explanatory memorandum had clear guidelines on this issue,84 specifying for 
example that if the dower is specified in the contract but the husband claims he paid 
more than this amount, the khul` shall be granted on the wife’s return of the amount 
specified in the contract, “and the husband may seek payment of his claim through a 
separate petition to the relevant court.”85 This may have been an answer to some 
opponents of the law who argued that the amount registered in the marriage contract 
does not represent ‘everything a man paid’ to effect the marriage to his wife, while 
not compromising on the wife’s right to a khul` divorce on the basis of official records 
of the dower payment.86 On this matter as well as on others, Soliman and Salah call 
for the publication of a formal and definitive Explanatory Memorandum to Law no.1 
of 2000 to guide the judiciary in its application.87 
 
 A further concern for Soliman and Salah is the length of time the courts are 
taking to process applications for khul`. In a review of 62 rulings for khul` in different 
courts in the first year of implementation, they found that half the cases took over 
eight months, in some cases taking up to 17 months.88 This is partly attributed to the 
extended requirements for reconciliation attempts insisted upon in the discussions of 
the text at the People’s Assembly,89 but even allowing for the extra periods where 
there are children to the marriage,90 it is reported that the deadlines may be missed 
                                                 
83
 Soliman and Salah, ‘Al-khul` qanunan wa tatbiqan,’ 37. The research covered six governorates and 
found 5323 claims for khul` submitted in 2000, with 220 resolved; in 2001 they found 5201 claims 
submitted. By comparison they found  5439 claims for tatliq submitted in 2000 and 5125 in 2001. 
84
 To the effect that if there is a disagreement on what prompt dower was paid, references is to be made 
to Article 19 of Law no.25 of 1929, requiring the wife to prove her statement and if she is unable to do 
so then allowing the husband’s statement to stand “provided he does not claim that which is not 
customarily a dower for her like/of her peers (mithlha)” in which case the ‘proper dower’ will be ruled 
for. Soliman and Salah, ‘Al-khul`’, 38. 
85
 Ibid 38. 
86
 It is noted by some that fees levied as a proportion of the registered dower may result in registration 
of either a symbolic dower or one that is lower than the amount actually paid. One of the questions 
over the implications of the new law is whether it will change the negotiations at the conclusion of 
marriage as well as at the end, with husbands-to-be seeking the registration of a higher dower. See 
Fawzi, ‘Muslim Personal Status Law.’ 
87
 Soliman and Salah, ‘Al-khul`’, 38. 
88
 Ibid 35. They note (at 36) that claims processed in the major urban centres in their survey (Cairo, 
Giza and Alexandria) were generally resolved more quickly than those outside those areas (Fayyoum 
and Suhag) , while Qena saw 205 claims submitted in 2000 but none resolved. 
89
 Zakariya, ‘Al-khul`,’ 69; Soliman and Salah, 29. 
90
 Article 18 (2) of Law No.1 of 2000 provides that if the couple have a child, “the court shall propose 
reconciliation at least two times separated by a period of not less than 30 and not more than 60 days.” 
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due, inter alia, to disagreements over how to resolve the issue of dower, repeated 
adjournments, and the attempts of some lawyers to initiate appeal despite the text of 
the law to the effect that a ruling for khul` is final.91 Of particular note in Soliman and 
Salah’s findings, however, is their listing of the reasons contributing to a shorter 
resolution time in the courts. They found that all the claims resolved in the relatively 
short period of three to nine months had one or more of four features in common. 
Two of these were the eventual agreement of the husband or mutual agreement of the 
spouses during the course of the claim, and a third was claims for khul` before 
consummation of the marriage. Significantly, the fourth feature was the changing of 
petitions originally submitted for judicial divorce (tatliq) on the various grounds of 
injury to petitions for  khul`, with the original tatliq application having already spent 
“not less than three years” in the courts.92 Specific examples given are khul` petitions 
describing not only fear of not being able to ‘live within the limits ordained by Allah,’ 
but also physical violence (beating) and humiliation, the husband’s polygynous 
marriage causing injury, desertion, lack of consummation, and other examples of 
conduct attributed to the husband that would, if proven, give rise to the wife’s right to 
a judicial divorce under existing Egyptian law without entailing forfeiture of her 
financial rights.93 
 
 In these cases, the problem is not with the khul` provision but with the failure 
of the legal system to provide proper and efficient remedy under the existing law 
where the wife has grounds and should not have to forfeit her financial rights. Writing 
in 2000, Dawoud el-Alami predicted that the khul` provision would provide a remedy 
for a woman who had the means to meet the financial obligations it entailed and who 
wanted a divorce “for no other reason than that she does not wish to be married to her 
husband.” However, he continued: 
 
the fact is that it is those who are most desperate and most vulnerable 
who are likely to resort to this device, in the knowledge that to pursue 
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 Zakariya, ‘Al-khul`,’ 68-69. 
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 Soliman and Salah, ‘Al-khul` qanunan wa tatbiqan’, 35 –36. 
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 Ibid, 32-34. 
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proper redress will be a painful and protected process with no 
guarantee of success.94 
 
 If Hoda Fahmi’s research from the 1980s still holds good today, it would 
appear that women with means – women from the ‘upper classes’ – would already 
have greater prospects of more reasonably expeditious treatment of a claim submitted 
for tatliq requiring the proving of grounds for a judicial divorce that would leave their 
financial rights intact. The promulgation of the khul` provision would thus indeed go 
some way to providing ‘equal access to divorce’ in the legal system for women from 
these social classes without grounds for divorce recognised in law, offering the 
possibility of a divorce ‘without the need to prove damage,’ as pointed out by the 
National Council for Women. However, for women of the ‘popular classes,’ there is 
clearly concern that uptake of the khul` provision may be prompted by an 
abandonment of claims for judicial divorce on grounds that the law has long 
recognised, but on the basis of which they have despaired of obtaining a divorce. 
While a khul` divorce in such cases provides a way out of the immediate situation, it 
is of course at the expense of established rights. 
 
It is clearly not the intention that a khul` divorce with its associated losses of 
shar`i rights for the wife should effectively be the only ‘practical’ avenue of judicial 
divorce for women.  Further research over a longer time period would be needed to 
permit an evaluation of the practical impact of the khul` provision on Egyptian 
women’s access to and rights on divorce, across the different classes. Such research 
would include not only the socio-economic standing of the litigants and the speed of 
resolution of the claims, but parallel studies of applications for judicial divorce on 
grounds of the different types of injury enumerated in the substantive law.  Here 
again, it will take time for the procedural changes introduced by Law No.1 of 2000 to 
produce the hoped-for result of speedier resolution of claims and reduced outlay on 
related fees in personal status litigation. The publication of detailed judicial 
guidelines, including in an Explanatory Memorandum, the familiarisation of the 
judiciary with those standards, and determined attention to addressing the problems of 
Egypt’s overburdened judicial system would doubtless contribute to the process. 
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Some women’s rights activists in the meantime remain convinced that what is really 
needed is a comprehensive review of Egypt’s substantive law on personal status, to 




If, as noted in the CEWLA report on the first two years of implementation of 
Law no.1 of 2000, the introduction of judicial khul` did not produce the ‘earthquake in 
the Egyptian family’ direly predicted in parts of the Egyptian press,95 it is clearly still 
hugely significant also beyond the field of judicial practice in Egypt. Dawoud el-
Alami calls it “nothing short of revolutionary”96 and Oussama Arabi finds evidence 
that it “marks a radical discontinuity with extant Islamic family law.”97 In Jordan, 
King Abdullah followed Egypt’s lead in substance, if not in process, including a 
similar (although not identical) provision for judicial khul` in amendments to Jordan’s 
Law of Personal Status which he issued by decree, along with a substantial amount of 
other such ‘temporary legislation’, during the prolonged absence of a sitting 
parliament, on the last day of December 2001.98 Women’s rights activists found 
themselves in a dilemma similar to that faced in Egypt after the promulgation of the 
1979 law. Called upon to review the temporary laws after being reconvened, in 
September 2003 Jordan’s parliament chose to refer the khul` provision to a legal 
committee for further study. Arabi’s argument that the khul` provision is part of a 
longer and wider “process of reconstruction of shari`a of unprecedented 
dimensions”99 is unlikely to be used in support of such legislation in government 
discourse, since the argument still tends to stress its ‘traditional’ legitimacy. Arabi’s 
exposition focuses not so much on the legislature, however, as on the role of Egypt’s 
Supreme Constitutional Court in evaluating, where called upon, whether particular 
pieces of Egyptian legislation are in accordance with the “principles of the 
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shari`a.”100 A challenge to Law No.1 of 2000 has already been lodged,101 and like the 
law itself, the deliberations of the Supreme Constitutional Court will be of 
considerable significance beyond as well as within Egypt’s borders. 
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